Why General Dannatt is not all the press thinks he is: A guest post by Julian Kavanagh
The Wardman Wire welcomes Julian Kavanagh, who has written a guest post for the Wire today.
Julian Kavanagh works in the City but has spent time as a researcher for an MP in the House of Commons and as a journalist. His interest in military matters comes from a father, grandfather and great-grandfather who all served in the Army and too much time spent reading Commando comics. Julian Kavanagh is a pseudonym.
General Sir Richard Dannatt is about to retire as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). He will retire with most commentators suggesting that he has been the most outspoken and most effective Head of the Army in the past 30 years. These same commentators will also lament Sir Richard’s retirement to the sinecure post of Constable of the Tower of London as a lost opportunity stating that he should have been the next Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). There’s no doubt either that somewhere a comparison will be drawn between Sir Richard’s outspokenness and the relative muteness – while in office – of his predecessor, Sir Mike Jackson.
Jackson became CGS in 2003 having been Commander-in-Chief Land Command (C-in-C Land), the no. 2 post in the Army, for the previous three years. He was, at that point, probably the best known military figure in the UK. Surrounded by some fairly anodyne figures at senior levels, his successes in Kosovo in 1999 and his colourful personality meant that most observers were expecting a distinctly exotic tenure as CGS. This never happened. Jackson had a war to fight in Iraq and devoted his attention to that.
Furthermore, as he explained in his Dimbleby lecture in December 2006, he felt it would be wrong for a serving officer to criticise his political masters openly. He also made it clear that he thought he would have a better chance of getting what he wanted if he fought his battles within the MoD rather than through the media. Of course, Jackson was widely lambasted in the press for his Dimbleby lecture where he was accused of speaking out when the pressure was off. Therefore, when General Dannatt arrived as CGS and immediately and openly criticised the British government over Iraq he was hailed as a star by the media.
Despite this supposed good start by Dannatt, Jackson was more effective as CGS because he was better, cleverer and wiser when playing politics within Whitehall. He made it plain during his Dimbleby lecture and in his autobiography that he was contemptuous of the MoD and he was also obviously outspoken within the MoD. However, perhaps because his political masters knew that he would not stitch them up with the media or other politicians, they respected him more. And, crucially, they delivered him more.
When Jackson retired, Britain was on the verge of fighting two separate campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan but his complaints in his Dimbleby lecture were not about manpower or about equipment – his major gripes revolved around decision-making and priorities within the MoD and soldiers’ pay. For sure, there were problems with manpower and with equipment but nothing approaching the issues that are currently being faced in Afghanistan by British troops.
Much of the blame for the problems in Afghanistan rests, of course, with the government and their reluctance to provide the necessary equipment and troops, even post-Iraq. They are also to blame for the lack of strategy and focus and if you doubt that, read Hansard from yesterday (13 July 09) and see if you can discern a strategy from either Bob Ainsworth or Gordon Brown’s responses to questions.
But also consider what Jackson achieved as CGS and wonder if that might be a crucial difference between 2006 and now. During his tenure, Jackson ended the arms plot whereby battalions of infantry would move every 18 months to 2 years. In most cases, battalions did not just move from Aldershot to Hounslow but from Blackpool to Winchester or Munster to South Wales. He did this in the face of massive opposition and accusations that he was simply doing his masters’ bidding.
In fact, he created a much more efficient army that can now deploy battalions more regularly and from the same base each time creating stability for ordinary soldiers and their families. The recession has kept many soldiers in the Army that might have left but so has the end of the arms plot. It also means that the Prime Minister, when asked yesterday if infantry regiments were to be cut further, was able to reply unequivocally, that it was not the case.
Vitally, by delivering this major shift in the Army’s organisation and the subsequent cost reductions, Jackson was able to bargain successfully elsewhere within the MoD. He kept his side of the bargain by pushing through an unpopular reorganisation but he was repaid with equipment and manpower. Again, look at Jackson’s gripes in 2006 and look at Dannatt’s gripes now – the difference between them is startling.
When Jackson left office, he was accompanied by a huge sigh of disappointment, mostly from hacks annoyed that he had not provided the copy that they were hoping for. In fact, he deserved huge plaudits – he had re-modelled the infantry into a more disciplined, more settled fighting arm and successfully created a platform within the UK for rapid deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Dannatt entered office apparently determined to attack the government. This must have been, in part, in frustration with Jackson’s vow of silence and his own experiences within the MoD as C-in-C Land. It was not wise to start at this point. The politicians, for all their faults, are the masters and they make the decisions they are elected to make and crucially, within the budgets that they have. Neither Admiral Sir Jonathan Band or Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy (First Sea Lord and Chief of the Air Staff respectively) have spoken out in the way that Dannatt has done and yet they have appear to have had much more success with their political masters despite the obvious need for the most funding to go to the Army.
Dannatt, for all his brave words, forgot that in the chain of command, the seniors must trust the juniors. Senior politicians, senior civil servants, perhaps even Sir Jock Stirrup himself have not been able to trust Dannatt and for that the Army has paid a high price indeed. How else can we explain the government’s attitude to the Army at the moment? It cannot just be a question of money but a question of trust, and trust in Dannatt’s judgement. Effectively the Army has been without a serious advocate at the very top table for the past 3 years.
No doubt when General Sir David Richards, a successful commander in Afghanistan, takes office this summer, things will change. Perhaps then, the commentators that are about to laud and praise General Dannatt for his bravery and his determination to stand up for ‘Our Boys’ might realise that taking such a stance within government is the better approach. They may even find time to apologise to General Jackson.
Categories: All WW, Parliaments, Westminster Watch
JK – a very interesting and enlightening piece. I think you are spot on too.
Dannat’s implied reason for being so vocal and political is, it seems, because the the government had broken its covenant with the British Army through lack of resources, funding and support while at the same time putting troops in more and more danger and active zones – often unnecessarily. There is clearly a problem in this area – or least a perceived one. But I do not believe the covenant had been broken – would be keen to hear what you think on that.
Dannatt has been far too political in my opinion. While his intentions may have been good (I have no idea if they were or not), the result of politicising the army has undermined his own staff and those fighting in Afghanistan and formerly in Iraq.
Comments about the so called exacerbating situation in Iraq and withdrawing troops from Iraq were for behind closed doors. War has always,to a greater or lesser extent, been about propaganda – never more so than today. Having political fights through the media is totally unacceptable for a Chief of the General Staff and does no one other than the enemy any favours. He has damaged the relationship between the political decision makers and army, something that cannot ever be a good thing.
In the same way that politics and religion should always have clear divisions, so should politics and the military. It is a dangerous situation to have a political figure in charge of the armed forces.
The problem today with this role is that it requires a Politician rather than a Military figure. It’s no good knowing what needs to be done, it’s knowing how it can be done with the current regime in power and who are the right people to approach, how to be toady at the right time and when to stand up for your beliefs and where you can do this. This unfortunately doesn’t fit nicely into the role of a soldier and causes this sort of friction to appear between Political and Military leaders.
Only a few generals are born to be able cope with this type of role alongside their military role.
Good Politicians though would understand this and nurture their Military advisers, but with the rapid changeover of Ministers and their lack of ability in this particular Government, combined with the fact that we have been fighting wars that have extended the Armed Forces above and beyond their capability mean that the relationships have been strained. The change to Richards may allow a new start to be made which may turn out better than the current situation, but with the current environment and the lack of capability and leadership in this government I’m not holding my breath.
Speculating before supper:
Is this another element of “regency” (OK, a bit later
politics where we need politico-military figures again as Clive of India/Nelson?
I’d like to go off about Defence Spending trends over 30 years, but supper calls.
M.
Thanks for this piece. It seemed to me that Dannatt also rather liked publicity, and was quite happy to feed the media with stories criticising the government / MoD. A different example was his pitch to be God’s General, ensuring his troops could meet their Maker with faith and hope. He might have done better to devote more time to doing his best to ensure they wouldn’t have to.
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[...] interesting post over at the Wardman Wire by Julian Kavanagh (a pseudonym) who works in the City but has spent time as a researcher for an MP in the House of [...]
Unwise rant. Gen Dannatt has done far more good than harm. At some point the government needs a Defence Minister with a backbone and this Prime Minister needs to listen more and act.
The Defence of the nation is not a second row appointment
Service before Self – Gen Dannatt MC
Policy before people – Gordon Brown
Wonder where Julian Kavanagh’s loyalties lie ?
Tommy Atkins – I think you have completely misunderstood and misread this entire piece, perhaps blinded by where your loyalties lie…
This piece is not a defence of Brown nor does it say anywhere that the defence is a “second row appointment”. It is a defence of the military and a criticism of how G.Dannatt has gone about being the link between the army and the government.
Thanks Garbo! I think what Tommy has misunderstood is that being CGS is a quasi-political post and its incumbents, no matter how much they dislike it, can only be effective if they realise that. They deal with political decision-making all day and every day and they have to put up with that system which has existed forever. War is, as Clausewitz said, a continuation of politics by other means.
No matter how much Tommy et al despise our political class and government, they have been elected to make decisions and the Chiefs of Staff are lobbyists at the top table seeking to influence those decisions. That won’t change whether Bob Ainsworth or Liam Fox is Secretary of State. Jackson worked within the system and was clearly highly effective. Dannatt has chosen to work outside it and has lost the trust of all senior decision-makers.
Again, Tommy, please, please look at the gripes of Jackson when he retired (also at a time of massive military deployments) and looks at Dannatt’s gripes and tell me it has nothing to do with the man at the top. It’s all very well being a media darling – as Dannatt is again today – but quiet, effective lobbying and closely-reasoned argument is clearly better.
Julian Kavanagh´s last blog ..WS: Trip to FeilongShan
[...] airwaves to get what they want out of politicians. It’s a newish phenomenon in the UK. For a rather sharper critique of the journo’s favourite General see this older post on the Wardman [...]
2 months on and 22 dead sadly over 120 injured serviceman while JK sits comfortable Milburn towers planning his next poorly considered brief.
Please don’t confuse my thoughts on Lt Gen Dannett MC as misguided loyalty (a word I suspect you have little concept of) nail your colours to the mast and declare your hand, you are British aren’t you ? Sometimes the unpalatable needs to be said and yes the politicians are uncomfortable with the truth. Lt Gen Dannett earned his MC in NI as a young Lt his credibility is beyond question. In NI helicopters were regularly used to get around to avoid roadside bombs so why is it so wrong for GCS to tell it how its is while still serving. He has always put service before self and the only other senior officer who was prepared to stand up and be counted was Admiral Boyce and Hoon sorted him out. Well done Boycey !
It is right that the Military is governed by ministers for the good of the nation but what a poor show. I can not recall an occasion where the Secretary of State for Defence (who well meaning) is out of his depth. Most have 2 or 3 hats it’s like an NVQ in cabinet.
I’m off to the beach to remind my self of extra ordinary contribution young men made to allow me to make my comments today. God Bless each and everyone of them.
JK well done son I know you are keen to make your name what ever its is but do yourself some credit and get out of the closet and say what you feel you need to and take the credit or flack for it in your own name. Get it right and you could be the next Max Hastings but sadly I suspect he is too right wing for you and I ‘m not convinced you would cope with the march to Port Stanley. Have a great day.
TA
[...] months ago I wrote this comment to an article on General Dannatt: The problem today with this role is that it requires a Politician rather than a Military figure. [...]
JK
Interesting piece. Your premise appears to be that a CGS has to be political if he is to get his way – a bit like a marriage, or if you were feeling less charitable, appeasement. You back up your argument by comparing the success of Jackson as CGS to Dannatt’s failure. I’ll take issue with you on a couple of fronts:
1. As others have bemoaned, Dannatt is political. He has recognised that Labour is a dead duck. Ministers do not have power any more. they do not drive the agenda. The power at this stage of the political cycle lies with the tabloids. Dannatt has used the tabloid press and the BBC (remember that interview with Paxman?) to force the government into conceding a lot of ground. It has also elevated the Army into a sacred cow, even among labour MPs, which it never was before. You also point out that the NAVY and Air Force have done better under Labour, which explains why they have received er…. nothing?
2. Much of your article focuses on the Arms Plot and its success. Firstly the arms plot only relates to the 40 infantry battalions. Secondly the Gurkhas, Household division and SAS are not part of this change.
3. Thirdly I don’t see how it has created a more stable environment for families. Soldiers still get posted as Corporals to Catterick, as Sergeants to a new Battalion, and again at Sergeant Major. Plus Battalions still move.
4. The Arms Plot was bought by abolishing 4 battalions, at a time when infantry troops have never been more in demand and tour intervals have never been worse.
5. The government treats the Army as cannon fodder, utterly contemptuous of their lives. Unsurprisingly, this level of trust and loyalty goes two ways.